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This paper examines how regional inequalities are affected by emission controls via credit trading 
and availability of absorption sources. We assume that homogeneous goods are costly traded 
without emission controls and that the rural areas have an advantage in terms of the availability of 
absorption sources. We especially focus on the long-term effects of firm relocation. Our two key 
findings are as follows. First, in the case where an emission control scheme is implemented 
without allowing for offsetting emissions with carbon absorption sources (carbon sinks), 
strengthening the emission controls drives firms to relocate from rural areas to urban areas, in the 
case that wage levels remain unchanged in both areas. As a result, regional inequalities in terms of 
both the number of firms and relative public welfare are enlarged by emission controls. Our 
second finding shows that in the case in which the emission control scheme allows for 
emissions-absorption offsetting, strengthening emission controls has mixed effects on the relative 
welfare of rural areas. Numerical simulations show that when the costs associated with 
transporting differentiated goods are relatively low, the introduction of emission controls with an 
offsetting system results in greater inequality across regions compared with introducing emission 
controls without such offsetting. 
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Developed countries are required to reduce the emission of greenhouse gas (GHG) to
their targets agreed on in the Kyoto Protocol. For this objective, each country tries (or
considers) introducing emissions trading schemes at domestic level. Meanwhile, Kyoto
Parties can use land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) in meeting their targets.
Forest management, cropland management, grazing land management, and revegetation
are all eligible LULUCF activities under the Protocol. Speci￿cally, developed countries
are given additional emission credit as Removal Unit (RMU) according to their supply of
absorption sources of GHG.
There is no doubt that such emission controls a⁄ect a national economy. For example,
Kuik and Mulder (2004) examine how alternative schemes of domestic emissions trading
in￿ uence emissions reduction and macroeconomic costs in the Netherland. Linn (2010)
examines the e⁄ect of cap-and-trade programs on pro￿ts of electric power company and
found that Nitrogen Oxides Budget Trading Program reduced expected pro￿ts by as much
as $25 billion. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies about the e⁄ect
of emission controls on regional inequalities in a nation.
In the present paper, we theoretically examine how regional inequalities are a⁄ected by
emission controls with credit trading and/or supply of absorption sources. Especially, we
focus on a long-run e⁄ect, namely, the e⁄ect of ￿rm relocation. Whether ￿rm relocation
is considered or not is essential for results. For example, if emission credit is given rural
areas according to their supply of absorption sources, they become rich because of credit
revenue, and, thus, an inequality between the urban and the rural is reduced in the short-
run. However, it is not necessarily true if we consider ￿rm relocation, since it changes the
market accessibility in each area, which in￿ uences the welfare via consumer prices.
For focusing on ￿rm relocation, we rely on the model used in the ￿elds of New Trade
Theory (NTT) and New Economic Geography (NEG) (e.g., Krugman, 1980; Fujita et al.,
1999; Baldwin et al., 2003). Speci￿cally, we take into account increasing returns to scale
(IRS) in manufacturing and endogenous creation of ￿rms based on the two-region model
of Helpman and Krugman (1985). In the model, number of ￿rms is determined by the in-
teraction between ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated varieties under monopolistic competition
and workers with love for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). There is one more (agricul-
tural) sector, characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS), perfect competition, and
1homogeneity of the good. A few papers investigate environmental policies using the NEG
framework (P￿ uger, 2001; Venables, 2001; Zeng and Zhao, 2009; Ishikawa and Okubo,
2009). However, they focus on international relocation of ￿rms reacting environmental
damages and/or policies, and do not analyze regional inequalities at domestic level, which
could be a⁄ected by environmental policies.
Most NTT or NEG studies including the above all papers suppose an unrealistic
assumption. Speci￿cally, the manufacturing good is assumed to be costly tradable while
the homogeneous good is assumed to be freely traded. Wages in two regions are equalized
by the assumption so that the general equilibrium analysis is quite simpli￿ed. However,
it is criticized by some authors (e.g., Davis, 1998) for its odds with reality. In order to
avoid such a criticism, we employ the model of Helpman and Krugman (1985) with trade
costs of homogeneous good (Davis, 1998; Takatsuka and Zeng, 2009). As a result, trade
costs of the homogeneous good are shown to be essential for our results.
Assuming that the homogeneous good is costly traded without emission controls and
the smaller region has an advantage for supply of absorption sources, we ￿nd the following
two main results. First, in the case of controls without supply of absorption sources, a
severer emission control necessarily moves more ￿rms to the larger region while wages
are unchanged. As a result, regional inequalities in terms of both ￿rm share and relative
welfare are enlarged by controls. Second, in the case of controls with supply of absorption
sources, the e⁄ect of controls on the relative welfare is ambiguous. Numerical simulations
show that the relative welfare of the larger region could be increased by controls for a
small manufacturing trade cost.
2 The model
The economy consists of two regions (N and S), two sectors (manufacturing and agricul-
ture), and one factor (labor). There are Lw workers in the economy, and each of them
owns one unit of labor. Denote the amounts of labor in N as L, and the counterpart in S
with an asterisk. Denote ￿ = L=Lw. Assume that region N is larger so that ￿ 2 (1=2;1).
Labor is mobile between sectors but immobile between regions.1 Furthermore, we assume
1If we allow interregional mobility of workers in our framework, the full agglomeration in one region
is the only possible equilibrium. A typical approach to avoid such a result is introducing immobile
2that the amount of labor in each region is su¢ ciently large so that the agricultural good
is produced in each region for any equilibria.
The manufacturing sector M consists of a continuum of product varieties, and it is
characterized by increasing returns to scale (IRS), monopolistic competition, while the
agricultural sector A produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale (CRS)
and perfect competition.
Workers are assumed to hold the same preference, which is described by a Cobb-















nw is the number of varieties in the M sector, and c(i) is the consumption of variety i.
Parameter ￿ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of good M,
and ￿ 2 (0;1) is the expenditure share on good M.
As in most related papers, we assume Samuelson￿ s iceberg transport costs. Speci￿cally,
￿M (resp. ￿A) units of the good M (resp. good A) must be shipped for one unit to reach
the other region. We assume that ￿M 2 (1;1) and ￿A ￿ 1 in the paper.
We introduce a greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission control and emission credit trading
into the model as follows. The M sector emits GHGs to produce varieties. Speci￿cally,
￿rms necessarily emit one unit of GHGs for producing one unit of variety. In order to
satisfy international environmental agreements, the national government must control
the total emission in the country to be under X. For the purpose, the government
introduces X units of emission credit (i.e., emission permit), one unit of which must
be purchased by ￿rms for their production of one unit of variety. Emission credit is
traded in a competitive market. The government is located in N. We assume that the
agricultural workers to the model (Krugman, 1991). However, the approach does not allow inter-sector
mobility of workers. As discussed below, a carbon-o⁄set program induces workers to move from the
manufacturing sector to the agricultural sector, which is not described by the model with immobility
between sectors.
3government expends its credit revenue on employing labor, which is used for its activities
(e.g., management of emission credit trading, the carbon-o⁄set program, and other policies
for global climate change) and does not in￿ uence individual￿ s utility. The reasons for
assuming this is as follows. First, it is realistic to some extent. For example, in the third
period (2013-2020) of EUETS, at least 50% of credit revenue promises to be used for
measures against global climate change and energy policies (Morotomi, 2010, p.185) rather
than some redistribution policies directly a⁄ecting welfare. Second, our setting gives a
benchmark case. If this benchmark case brings an unfavorable result on inequalities, we
could conclude that some portion of credit revenue should be used for reducing inequalities.
Third, as shown below, we obtain some analytical and clear-cut results by this assumption.
We normalize the price of good A in S as p￿
A = 1 and denote the price of good A in
N as pA. In the agricultural production, one unit of labor produces one unit of good A.
Thus, the wages in N and S are
w = pA, w
￿ = p
￿
A = 1, (2)








Each ￿rm in the M sector needs a ￿xed cost of f unit of labor, and marginal costs of
m units of labor and one unit of emission credit. Therefore, the total costs of producing
x units of manufactured varieties are, respectively,





MC = mw + q, MC
￿ = mw
￿ + q, (5)
and where q is the price of emission credit.
Let p be the price of a manufacturing variety in N made in N, p￿ be the price of a
4variety in S made in S, ￿ p be the price of a variety in N made in S, and ￿ p￿ be the price



















From (1), the demands (plus iceberg costs) of each variety produced in N and S are
dM = ￿
p￿￿





























and n and n￿ are numbers of ￿rms in N and S. On the other hand, from (1), the demands






A = (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿, (9)
respectively.
In the model, free entry and exit of ￿rms are assumed so that ￿rms have zero pro￿t.









l = f + mx, l
￿ = f + mx
￿, (11)
respectively. From (3), (7), (8), and (10), the market-clearing condition for varieties of




























2Because of symmetry among varieties, this price is independent of the variety name.
5respectively, where ￿M ￿ ￿
1￿￿
M is the trade freeness of good M. From (6), these equations







































It is noteworthy that if ￿rms fully agglomerate in region N (resp. S), only (12) (resp.
(13)) holds.
If the emission control is binding (i.e., X is less than the total emission without
controls), the market-clearing condition for emission credit is
X = nx + n
￿x
￿. (14)











3 Equilibrium without controls
In the case without emission controls (or X is su¢ ciently large, and, thus, q = 0), our
model is equivalent to the model of Helpman and Krugman (1985, Section 10.4) with
trade costs of good A, which is ￿rst analyzed by Davis (1998). Takatsuka and Zeng
(2009, Section 2) reexamine the model and ￿nd the following fact (their Proposition 1):




agricultural transport costs so that
(i) good A is exported from S to N if ￿A < e ￿A; otherwise, good A is not traded;
(ii) it holds that n=(n + n￿) ￿ ￿, where the equality holds only for ￿A ￿ e ￿A.
6By Proposition 1 (i),3 we have
pA = ￿A for ￿A < e ￿A, (16)
pA = e ￿A for ￿A ￿ e ￿A. (17)
Therefore, the equilibrium values (w;w￿;MC;MC￿;x;x￿;l;l￿;n;n￿;pA) are determined by
(2), (5), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (16) (or (17)). Proposition 1 (ii) suggests that the
￿home market e⁄ect￿(Krugman, 1980; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) appears if and only
if ￿A < e ￿A.
Using this proposition, we derive the following result on the welfare:
Proposition 2 In the case without emission controls, the welfare in N is higher than that
in S.












It is su¢ cient to prove that the above inequality holds. From (2), (16), and (17), it




M < ￿M, which implies w1￿￿ > ￿M > ￿Mw1￿￿. Therefore, we have
n
n￿ > 1 >
w1￿￿ ￿ ￿M
w1￿￿ ￿ ￿M(w1￿￿)2 =
w1￿￿ ￿ ￿M
w1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿Mw1￿￿)
, (19)
where the ￿rst inequality is from Proposition 1 (ii). Inequality (19) implies that (18) is
true. ￿
In summary, without emission controls, the larger region has a higher wage, a more-
than-proportionate share of ￿rms, and a higher level of welfare. In other words, the
market equilibrium entails these regional inequalities.
In the following sections, we assume that ￿A < e ￿A holds, i.e., region N is the importer
of good A without controls, since such a trade pattern is popular in the real world.
3The threshold e ￿A is a unique solution of F(￿A) ￿ (￿
1￿￿
A ￿ ￿A￿M)￿ ￿ (￿￿
A ￿ ￿M)(1 ￿ ￿) = 0. See
Takatsuka and Zeng (2009, Appendix A).
7Assumption 1 It is assumed that ￿A < e ￿A holds, i.e., region N is the importer of good
A without controls.
4 E⁄ects of emission controls
In this section, we examine how emission controls e⁄ect on regional inequalities in the
terms aforementioned. Before analyzing e⁄ects of controls, we derive some useful lemmas.
From (5), we know that w (resp. w￿) and MC (resp. MC￿) are related each other.
However, now treat them as if they were independent. Then, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Treat w (resp. w￿) and MC (resp. MC￿) as if they were independent.
(i) In the interior equilibrium, n (resp. n￿) decreases (resp. increases) with MC=MC￿ and
w=w￿.
(ii) In the corner equilibrium with n￿ = 0 (resp. n = 0), n (resp. n￿) decreases (resp.
increases) with w=w￿, and is independent with MC=MC￿.
Proof. (i) Equations (12) and (13) immediately derive
￿wLw
nMC















































￿M > 0 (21)






















































From (20) and (21), we know that the denominators in (22) and (23) are positive. Noting
8this fact and treating w=w￿ and MC=MC￿ as if they were independent, (22) and (23)
immediately imply that n (resp. n￿) decreases (resp. increases) with w=w￿ and MC=MC￿.


















w￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
i
(25)
from (13). The second result of the lemma is immediately obtained by these equations. ￿
Clearly, a higher MC=MC￿ implies a negative e⁄ect on the manufacturing production
in N, since it means a relatively higher marginal cost there, which results in a relatively
higher price and less demand. On the other hand, w=w￿ includes both positive and
negative e⁄ects on the manufacturing production in N. A higher w=w￿ means a higher
wage income in N, which implies a positive e⁄ect since the market size is relatively larger
there if other things being equal. However, it also means a relatively higher ￿xed cost
in N, which is a negative e⁄ect. Lemma 1 claims that even if a higher w=w￿ entails the
positive e⁄ect, the negative e⁄ect necessarily dominates the positive one, and, thus, the
number of ￿rms in N decreases.
Next, concerning the e⁄ects of the emission credit price q on the total manufacturing
production, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 2 For ￿xed wages, the total manufacturing production nx+n￿x￿ strictly decreases
in q.
Proof. From (5) and (10), both x and x￿ decrease in q. With (24) and (25), we know
that nx + n￿x￿ decreases in q for a corner equilibrium. For an interior equilibrium, from






































































This lemma implies that a severer emission control is equivalent to a higher credit
price for ￿xed wages. As we show later, the wages are unchanged even if the credit price
rises under Assumption 1. Thus, in the rest part of this section, we consider the situation
with a severer emission control as that with a higher credit price.
4.1 The case of costlessly tradable A
First, we examine the case that ￿A = 1, i.e., good A is costlessly traded. Many existing
studies (e.g., Venables, 2001; Zeng and Zhao, 2009; Ishikawa and Okubo, 2009) suppose
this assumption for simplicity. However, this assumption is not only unrealistic (Davis,
1998) but also gives a very di⁄erent result in contrast with the case that ￿A > 1. This is
because the free-trade of good A never generate wage di⁄erentials between two regions.
In fact, if ￿A = 1(= w), by (2), (5), and (16), we have w=w￿ =MC=MC￿ = 1 with
or without controls. Thus, by Lemma 1, we know that the number of ￿rms in each
region is unchanged by emission controls. On the other hand, emission controls increase
manufacturing prices because of higher credit prices, and, thus, we know that welfare
levels in both regions are decreased due to higher price indices. However, from (6) and































which remains a constant, and, thus, the relative welfare V=V ￿ is neither a⁄ected by
emission controls. In summary, although emission controls increase manufacturing prices
and decrease welfare levels, they do not change regional inequalities such as w=w￿, n=(n+
n￿), and V=V ￿.
Proposition 3 If ￿A = 1, any emission controls do not change wages, numbers of ￿rms,
and the relative welfare.
104.2 The case of costly tradable A
Next, we consider the case that ￿A 2 (1;e ￿A). Without controls, region N imports good A
from S by the argument in Section 3. Thus, with a marginal control, N still imports good
A. Thus, from (2), (5), and (16), we have
w = ￿A, w
￿ = 1, (27)
MC = m￿A + q, MC
￿ = m + q. (28)
These equations imply that w=w￿ is not changed by the control, while MC=MC￿ decreases
from ￿A to (m￿A+q)=(m+q). Thus, by Lemma 1, n (resp. n￿) increases (resp. decreases)
in the interior equilibrium, and both n and n￿ are unchanged in the corner equilibrium
with n￿ = 0. On the other hand, it holds that
l




from (10) and (11). Thus, we know that l￿ is decreased by the control since MC￿ increases




￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)E
￿. (30)
increases, since both n￿ and l￿ decreases in the interior equilibrium and l￿ decreases in
the corner equilibrium. This con￿rms that, with any levels of controls, N imports good
A and (27) and (28) hold, which also implies that w is still equal to ￿A.
Finally, from (26), the relative price index P=P ￿ is decreased by emission controls
since MC=MC￿ decreases and n=n￿ increases in the interior equilibrium and MC=MC￿












Summing up, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assume that ￿A 2 (1;e ￿A). Then, emission controls increase the relative
welfare in N (V=V ￿), while the wages are unchanged. Furthermore,
11(i) in the interior equilibrium, n (resp. n￿) is increased (resp. decreased), and
(ii) in the corner equilibrium, both n and n￿ are unchanged.
This proposition states that although nominal wages are not changed by controls, the
real wage inequality is increased in terms of welfare ratio V=V ￿. The reason is simple. Firm
distribution is determined by the balance of the market-access e⁄ect and the production-
cost e⁄ect (e.g., Amiti, 1998; Laussel and Paul, 2007). In other words, in a larger region,
the larger market attracts more ￿rms while the higher production costs work against ￿rm
location. Emission controls do not change the market-access e⁄ect since nominal wages
are una⁄ected, while they in￿ uence the production-cost e⁄ect. Speci￿cally, the marginal
cost in S is relatively increased, which implies that the advantage of a small region is
weakened. This is because the identical charge (purchase of credit) is required for an
additional production in both regions with di⁄erent marginal costs (wages). Therefore,
more ￿rms agglomerate in the large region, which decreases the price index in N relatively.
The price index in N is also relatively lowered by decreasing of MC=MC￿, since it implies
that the manufacturing price in N is relatively lowered. Therefore, emission controls
increase the welfare in N relatively. In the corner equilibrium, ￿rm location is unchanged
but MC=MC￿ decreases. Thus, the relative welfare in N is increased again.
5 Supply of absorption sources
The previous section clari￿es that if good A is costly traded without controls, introducing
emission controls must increase regional inequalities in terms of ￿rm share n=(n + n￿)
and relative welfare V=V ￿. In this section, we examine the case of controls with supply of
absorption sources.
Here, we assume that the A sector provides absorption sources of GHGs. For simplicity,
we assume that the production of one unit of good A entails k (resp. k￿) units of absorption
sources (net of supply costs) in N (resp. S).4 In addition, we suppose that k ￿ k￿ since
4In other words, we exogenously give the supply of homogeneous good and absorption sources per
worker in each region. However, our main message is not changed even if they are endogenously deter-
mined. Therefore, regional inequality in terms of relative welfare could be enlarged even in comparison
with the case of controls without supply of absorption sources. This is because the carbon-o⁄set program
increases the relative income in region S while it induces workers to move from the manufacturing sector
to the agricultural sector, which lowers the market access.
12there are usually rich natural resources (e.g. forestry) for absorption of GHGs in periphery
regions. One unit of GHGs is absorbed by one unit of absorption sources. Thus, each
worker in the A sector obtain k (resp. k￿) units of emission credit in N (resp. S), and, in
this case, we have
w = pA + kq, w
￿ = 1 + k
￿q, (31)
instead of (2). In addition, the market-clearing condition for emission credit (14) is
replaced by
X + ksA + k
￿s
￿
A = nx + n
￿x
￿, (32)
where sA is the agricultural production in N.
If emission controls are moderate (i.e., X is large) and/or supply of absorption sources
is large, q could be zero. In such a case, nothing could be changed by controls. If emission
controls are binding, i.e., q > 0 holds, and region N still imports good A from S, we have
w = ￿A + kq, w
￿ = 1 + k
￿q, (33)
MC = m￿A + (mk + 1)q, MC
￿ = m + (mk
￿ + 1)q, (34)
from (5), (16), and (31). Equation (33) implies that w=w￿ is decreased from ￿A to
(￿A + kq)=(1 + k￿q) by the control. In addition, by (34), MC=MC￿ also decreases from
￿A to (￿A + kq + q=m)=(1 + k￿q + q=m). Thus, by Lemma 1, n (resp. n￿) increases
(resp. decreases) in the interior equilibrium, and n increases in the corner equilibrium
with n￿ = 0. This implies that the ￿rm share of N n=(n + n￿) increases.
There are some remarks. First, contrastive to the case of previous section, we do not
know whether the relative welfare V=V ￿ is increased or decreased by controls. This is
because the relative wage w=w￿ is decreased since k ￿ k￿. In other words, in region N,
the ￿rm share increases while the relative wage decreases, and, thus, whether the relative
welfare increases or decreases depends on the balance of these two changes. Second, if
emission controls are moderate, the supply of absorption sources reduces the ￿rm share
inequality in comparison with the case of controls without absorption sources. Typically, it
holds when q = 0. However, third, if emission controls are severe, the supply of absorption
13sources might increase the ￿rm share inequality in comparison with the case of controls
without absorption sources. This is because, in the present case, not only MC=MC￿ but
also w=w￿ is decreased because of the credit revenue.
5.1 Numerical simulations
Figure 1 illustrates a simulation example of ￿ = 5, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:4, m = 0:1, f = 0:1,
Lw = 100, k = 0, k￿ = 1, ￿A = 1:02. The four cases correspond to four ￿M values: (a)
1.44, (b) 1.33, (c) 1.22, (d) 1.075. Assumption 1 holds in this setting. Furthermore, region
N always imports good A from S with supply of absorption sources in our simulation.
Amount of GHG emission is depicted on the horizontal axis in all panels (100% = the
case without controls), and the ￿rm share of N (n=(n + n￿)) and the relative welfare
(V=V ￿) of N are on the vertical axis in left-side and right-side panels, respectively. The
solid (resp. dotted) lines in graphs correspond to the case without (resp. with) supply of
absorption sources.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
These panels con￿rm Proposition 4. Without supply of absorption sources, a severer
emission control necessarily brings a higher n=(n+n￿) and a higher V=V ￿. Furthermore,
we observe that this tendency of ￿rm relocation is strengthened by a lower ￿M. In fact,
in Case (d) with the smallest ￿M, ￿rms fully agglomerate in region N when controls make
GHG emission less than 77% of the present. The reason is as follows. More ￿rms locate
in N under severer emission controls because the production cost becomes relatively lower
there. If ￿M is small enough as in a free-trade economy, this tendency is signi￿cant since
the production-cost e⁄ect becomes dominant. On the other hand, if ￿M is very large as in
a closed economy, the market-access e⁄ect is dominant, and, thus, ￿rms tend to disperse
subject to the market sizes of two regions.
Next, turn to the case with supply of absorption sources. In the case, we also con￿rm
some points discussed above. Firstly, when emission controls are moderate (i.e., GHG
emission is large), both the ￿rm share and the relative welfare are the same as in the
case without controls. This is because the credit price is zero. Secondly, the ￿rm share
of N increases with the intensity of emission controls more remarkably than the case
without absorption sources. This is because, as aforementioned, both MC=MC￿ and
14w=w￿ decreases because of the credit revenue for region S. In addition, the tendency is
strengthened by a lower ￿M again. Thirdly, the relative welfare decreases in some case
while the opposite holds in other cases. According to Figure 1, in Case (a) with the
largest ￿M, the relative welfare monotonically decreases with the intensity of emission
controls. In other words, regional inequality in terms of relative welfare is reduced in
comparison with both the case without controls and the case with controls without supply
of absorption sources. This is because increasing of the ￿rm share of N is moderate for
a larger ￿M, and, thus, decreasing of the relative wage of N dominantly in￿ uence the
relative welfare. However, for a smaller ￿M, the balance of these two changes could be
opposite. Speci￿cally, in Case (b), the relative welfare is still lower than the case without
absorption sources, but it increases with the intensity of emission controls for a range.
In other words, although regional inequality in terms of relative welfare is reduced in
comparison with the case of controls without supply of absorption sources, it is enlarged
in comparison with the case without controls. Furthermore, in Cases (c) and (d), we
observe that it could be enlarged even in comparison with the case of controls without
supply of absorption sources. This is clearly because increasing of the ￿rm share of N
dominantly in￿ uences the relative welfare.
It should be noted that the government is supposed to expend its credit revenue on
employing labor, which is used for its activities and does not in￿ uence individual￿ s utility.
As aforementioned, this setting gives a benchmark case. If this benchmark case unfa-
vorably enlarges inequalities, some portion of credit revenue should be used for reducing
inequalities.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined how regional inequalities are a⁄ected by emission controls with
credit trading and/or supply of absorption sources considering ￿rm relocation. Assuming
that the homogeneous good is costly traded without controls and the smaller region has an
advantage for supply of absorption sources, we ￿nd the following two main results. First,
in the case of controls without supply of absorption sources, a severer emission control
necessarily moves more ￿rms to the larger region while wages are unchanged. As a result,
the relative welfare of N rises. In other words, regional inequalities in terms of both ￿rm
15share and relative welfare are enlarged by controls. This is because the marginal cost
in the smaller region is relatively increased because of the purchase of emission credit,
which weakens the advantage of the region. Second, in the case of controls with supply
of absorption sources, we expect that a severer control brings more ￿rms in the larger
region but the relative wage of N decreases. As a result, the e⁄ect of controls on the
relative welfare is ambiguous. Numerical simulations show that the relative welfare of N
is decreased by controls for a large manufacturing trade cost while it could be increased
for a small manufacturing trade cost. This is because if the manufacturing trade costs
are small enough as in a free-trade economy, the production-cost e⁄ect dominates the
market-access e⁄ect, and, thus, ￿rms signi￿cantly agglomerate in the larger region under
the emission control.
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Figure 1. Regional Inequalities under the Emission Controls with or without Supply of Absorption Sources. 
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